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After the time of Russell and Wittgenstein, the question of the nature (ontological status) of logical constants is peripherally affected by many discussions within contemporary philosophy. This article would have a contribution to the extent that: (1) studies specifically devoted to the status of logical constants are practically isolated from the main debates within the analytical metaphysics or absent entirely; 2) the text would highlight the fundamental problems that Russell's philosophical logic enshrines, and which Wittgenstein does not entirely decide, especially about the form of the propositions and its subject (logical constants) from a new point of view. The goal I set is to answer the question of what are the constants from an ontological point of view? Whether the logical constants are objects of acquaintance, entities, a way of combining the components of the proposition, or can be considered only as language constructs.
Keywords: analytical philosophy, analytical metaphysics, logical constants, proposition.
Abstract: Russell's understanding of implication in The Principles of Mathematics (1903) is dual. At the heart of this understanding we find two concepts: material and formal implication. In the paper I give the reasons why Russell had to introduce the distinction between formal and material implications. I then draw the consequences of the distinction with special attention to their direct effect on logical affirmation and logical conclusion.
Key words: proposition, propositional function, material implication, formal implication, logical conclusion.
Platonic Realism and the Project of Philosophical Logic
The article is based on the main problems that the Russel's onthology (platonic realism) generates. The extreme realism that the philosopher allows is a fundament of his philosophical logic. From another point of view, persisting on this kind of realism leads to unsolvable problems on the field of philosophical logic.
Key words: Russell, philosophical logic, Platonic realism, logical form, Wittgenstein