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Logical Fictions and Constructions: Russell and the Relational View of Objective Time
Abstract:
The paper present the chronology of Russell's attempts to develop a method for treating the moments of time as logical constructions, derived from the temporal relations of precedence and simultaneity between sets of events. It is organized as follows: (§1) introduces the key terminological distinctions between objective and subjective time, correspondingly between absolute and relational theories of time, (§2) discusses the relation between these two pairs of terms, along with the merits of the opposed conceptions of time; (§3) presents the various reasons, motivating Russell's suspicions that these are in fact the absolute and the relational conception of time are alternative, and that it is possible to formulate a consistent and internally coherent relational theory of time which differs essentially from the absolute conception, (§4) juxtaposes the different approaches to the formal deduction of the properties of the temporal series, which Russell has developed in the period 1913-1948 and concludes with some brief remarks on the inter-relations between logic, ontology and epistemology, as Russell has conceived them in his works.
Keywords: Bertrand Russell, time order, relational theory of time
Abstract:
This essay introduces and strives to show the untenability of the (somewhat unjustly named) “dogma of Aristotelianism”. (§1) lists the principal tenets of the Aristotelian dogma and examines to what extent they are attributable to Aristotle, (§2) analyzes the first part of the dogma – the claim that mathematics is the study if quantity and hence is irrelevant to the study of qualitative structures, (§3) reviews briefly the concept of semiorder and discusses the possibility to interpret it as the foundation of the mathematical treatment of qualities, (§4) traces the genetic links between the algebraic theory of semiorders and the formal elaboration of the so-called preference logic, while (§5) develops on this basis a somewhat controversial claim, relating to the last part of the Aristotelian dogma – (ir)rationality of desire.
Keywords: philosophy of mathematics, semiorders, logic of preference, rationality.
Astract
The paper addresses the question of whether Strawson’s claim that ordinary language has no exact logic entails a view according to which it is in ordinary language’s nature to be ‘illogical’. It is first explained where the traditional idea of an exact, language-independent logic comes from, i.e. the idea of a logic which underlies ordinary languages and governs their logical use and which lack – if Strawson’s assumption is right – would leave ordinary languages being ‘illogical’ insofar as there would be nothing to eliminate their logical imperfections. Secondly, it is shown that it is inherent to language – to human language in contrast to animal ones – to be ‘logical’, because language games are typically introduced, explained, learned, and played out in a practice of giving and asking for reasons , which means, so to speak, in a ‘logical space’. Thus the fact that ordinary language has no exact logic – in the sense that there is no one-to-one correspondence between its (grammatico-)syntactic and its (logico-)semantic sentence forms – does not exclude the possibilities for it to be used in a logical manner.
Key words: metaphisics, thinking, framed feature model
Abstract:
This essay introduces and strives to show the untenability of the (somewhat unjustly named) “dogma of Aristotelianism”. (§1) lists the principal tenets of the Aristotelian dogma and examines to what extent they are attributable to Aristotle, (§2) analyzes the first part of the dogma – the claim that mathematics is the study if quantity and hence is irrelevant to the study of qualitative structures, (§3) reviews briefly the concept of semiorder and discusses the possibility to interpret it as the foundation of the mathematical treatment of qualities, (§4) traces the genetic links between the algebraic theory of semiorders and the formal elaboration of the so-called preference logic, while (§5) develops on this basis a somewhat controversial claim, relating to the last part of the Aristotelian dogma – (ir)rationality of desire.
Keywords: philosophy of mathematics, semiorders, logic of preference, rationality.
Astract
The paper addresses the question of whether Strawson’s claim that ordinary language has no exact logic entails a view according to which it is in ordinary language’s nature to be ‘illogical’. It is first explained where the traditional idea of an exact, language-independent logic comes from, i.e. the idea of a logic which underlies ordinary languages and governs their logical use and which lack – if Strawson’s assumption is right – would leave ordinary languages being ‘illogical’ insofar as there would be nothing to eliminate their logical imperfections. Secondly, it is shown that it is inherent to language – to human language in contrast to animal ones – to be ‘logical’, because language games are typically introduced, explained, learned, and played out in a practice of giving and asking for reasons , which means, so to speak, in a ‘logical space’. Thus the fact that ordinary language has no exact logic – in the sense that there is no one-to-one correspondence between its (grammatico-)syntactic and its (logico-)semantic sentence forms – does not exclude the possibilities for it to be used in a logical manner.
Key words: metaphisics, thinking, framed feature model