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This paper’s departure point is Dolf Rami’s book "Existenz und Anzahl. Eine kritische Untersuchung von Freges Konzeption der Existenz" (Mentis, 2018). In his book, Rami builds upon an argument that Frege’s notion of existence is hybrid in the sense that it combines two different concepts for existence. One of these is a first-level deflationary concept. It is a concept borrowed from the universalist paradigm prior to Kant, according to which being or existence is a universal concept: one that can be truthfully predicated of anything. The other concept is a second-level substantial concept. It is explicated in the conceptualist paradigm of the Frege-Russel-Quine tradition, according to which existence should be regarded a property of a concept and predicating it equals to stating that objects (or at least an object) fall under the concept in question. This paper calls into question Rami’s argument that Frege attempts to combine these two different concepts, as well as his sub-argument that the first-level universal concept is more basic and Frege might have noticed this. As a first step, Frege’s theory of second-level concepts is introduced. Then, the two concepts that Remi distinguishes between are discussed. This completes the first part of the article. In the second part, it would be demonstrated that what Rami refers to as a first-level universal concept, Frege treats within the framework of his presupposition theory of singular terms, and also that the connection between this theory and the notion of existence as second-level concept is not the one that Remi imagines it is.
Keywords: Frege, existence, second-level concepts, singular terms
Summary: What distinguishes Frege’s approach to logic from the traditional ways of developing logical theory are its semantic features:logical phenomena are investigated against the background of our speaking about the world. This is manifested in the Fregean terminology in which concepts like those of sense and reference that describe the relations between the language and the world, and thereby the meanings of linguistic expressions, play central role. Frege’s semantic approach ensues from his orientation towards the notion of truth. According to him, the notion of truth is supremely fundamental and cannot be reduced to simpler notions. That is why, in order to elucidate it, Frege appeals to our practice of speaking and, more concretely, to the practice of making assertions. This gives an intriguing pragmatic nuance to his logical enterprise. After analyzing the relevant texts, we can say that by discussing the notion of truth in the context of the topic of assertion, Frege anticipates some important ideas that have been developed as late as in the middle of the 20th century by J. Austin and J. Searle within the framework of the speech act theory.
Keywords: Frege, assertion, speech act theory
The Concept of ‘Logical Space’ in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
The current paper presents an attempt at clarifying the meaning of the words ‘logical space’ in the Tractatus 1.13 ‘The facts in logical space are the world’. This is achieved though exploring the concepts of ‘state of affairs’, ‘possible state of affairs’, ‘existing state of affairs’, ‘the existence and non-existence of states of affairs’, ‘fact’, ‘positive fact’, ‘negative fact’.
Keywords: Wittgenstein, Tractatus, logical space, state of affairs, possible world, truth-maker, reality.