Кантианската гледна точка за ролята на моралния прогрес в постигането на космополитния идеал

1 Introduction

In one of his most prominent political texts, Towards Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, Kant discusses that the ultimate goal (telos) in nature is to achieve perpetual peace, and addresses the main question of the text as how to realize it. {1} In general, Kant takes a positive view of the possibility of achieving perpetual peace at the national, international, and global levels. He essentially proposes that perpetual peace can be established on the basis of unification under the rational and universal ideals of humanity, namely justice, freedom and equality. On the national level, Kant advocates that every nation should be founded as a republican constitutional state, a form of government grounded upon the universal principles of justice, equality, and freedom. On the international level, he argues that nations should not remain isolated from each other, but should unite under universal ideals to form an international union, federalism. The final stage of perpetual peace, however, is said to be cosmopolitanism, in which individuals are viewed not only as citizens of a particular political state or international union, but as members of a single moral community (world) that embraces the aforementioned universal principles. In this way, Kant argues that the cosmopolitan ideal is not a hopeless dream, but a realizable project through the three-stage development of societies.

Concerning the methods to attain the cosmopolitan ideal of peace and freedom, Kant offers a highly distinctive approach. By rejecting any top-down methods such as the overthrow of political power, war, or revolution etc., he argues that the cosmopolitan ideal can only be achieved through a gradual reform or progress. In this paper, I associate the Kantian term of gradual progress and reform with the advancement of moral maturity and enlightenment of individuals who would gradually cultivate themselves in terms of the concepts of justice, equality, and freedom. Therefore, I focus on the fact that Kant gives priority to the microcosmic level of moral development in relation to the universal concepts of equality, freedom, and justice over any systematic or top-down method of achieving the cosmopolitan ideal of peace and freedom. In this way, I wish to show that the moral development of individuals or citizens in terms of the universal principles of equality, freedom, and justice is the most important prerequisite for the possibility of creating a peaceful, just, and free cosmopolitan society. In this sense, I propose that the moral improvement of citizens, such as the ability to think autonomously, to give meaning to the ideals of justice, equality and freedom, etc., must be the ultimate goals that states and authorities must ensure in order to come closer to the ideal of cosmopolitanism.

 

2 The Ideal Form of Government: Republican Constitutionalism

Before analyzing the concept of republican constitutionalism in detail, it is appropriate to first describe the concept of civil society in Kantian thought. First, it is apt to say that the Kantian conception of civil society is a necessary phenomenon in human history in a social and moral sense. In his political writings, Kant basically argues that civil society arose out of necessity. In Toward Perpetual Peace, he assumes that in the absence of a civil society, that is, in a state of nature, individuals are in a constant state of war and conflict in which they lack peace and security (Kant, 2006, 8:349, p. 72 and Doyle, 2006, p. 203). In this account, Kant offers almost a Hobbesian type of state of nature theory in which people are portrayed as antagonistic and hostile to one another because they lack a binding mechanism or power that controls them (Tuck, 1999, p. 207-208). Therefore, Kant suggests that civil organization between individuals promises the only way out of chaotic and hostile existence in a state of nature. In addition to overcoming chaos and uncertainty, Kant argues that the establishment of a civil society would also enable people to develop their natural capacities. In "Idea for a Universal History," Kant writes that socialization is an indispensable phenomenon for the growth of individuals' natural capacities (Kant, 2006, 8:22, p. 8; Covell, 1998, p. 150). Kant also points out that man is a rational being who cannot simply live a slavish life in nature (Kant, 2006, 8:354, p. 78). In other words, he believes that man as a rational being should overcome the brutal way of life in the state of nature. As is well known, Kant associates the state of nature (status naturalis) with savage freedom and describes it as a condition in which people live in a barbaric, uncultured and brutal way. Literally, Kant condemns this form of freedom as irrational and argues that humanity should necessarily establish a rational form of freedom in a civil society. W. B. Gallie, in Philosophers of Peace and War, points to this distinction Kant makes between two forms of freedom, by calling the form of freedom in the civil state as 'lawful freedom' and the form of freedom in the state of nature as the 'natural freedom' (Gallie, 1978, p. 21). Gallie defines 'lawful freedom' as a state in which people treat each other as ends, but never as means. In this context, Gallie emphasizes that the Kantian conception of the civil state promises a state of rational and moral existence in which people learn to respect the freedom of others and develop their moral identity as ends in themselves. Thus, Gallie points out that Kant's political theory recognizes civil society as a rational form of existence that necessarily contributes to the rational and moral growth of its individuals.

Moreover, Kant argues that civil society is not an arbitrary organism, but a rationally constructed one. Charles Covell, in Kant and Law of Peace, argues that Kant does not view the state as a historical fact that naturally emerges from a social contract between individuals, but rather accepts it as a construction built by the rational efforts and ideals of individuals (Covell, 1998, p. 54-55).{2} In this regard, in the "Idea for a Universal History," Kant asserts that nature has the will of men to establish a civil society. Furthermore, Kant argues that an ideal society is a construction of individuals based on the rational ideals of humanity, by stating: “The greatest problem for the human spirits, the solution of which nature compels him to seek, is that of attaining a civil society which can administer justice ultimately” (Kant, 2006, 8:290, p. 45). Kant also adds, “Nature’s highest intent for humankind, that is, the development of all of the latter’s natural predispositions, can be realized only in society, and more precisely, in a society that possesses the greatest degree of freedom” (Kant, 2006, 8:22, p. 8). Therefore, Kant suggests that the ultimate elements of a civil society are the rational principles of justice and freedom. Peter Nicholson beautifully articulates in his article that the state of nature in Kantian political theory is a state in which there is no justice because there is no judge who is legally binding. Nicholson, on the other hand, defines Kantian civil society as a state in which people are under moral laws (Nicholson, 1976, p. 216). Thus, Nicholson implies that according to Kant, the true form of civil society can be created through the efforts of individuals based on the rational and moral ideals. In summary, the Kantian conception of a civil state is a rational and moral form of existence that is constructed through the rational efforts of individuals and promises them a peaceful and free environment in which they can develop naturally and morally.

In Toward Perpetual Peace, in which Kant essentially addresses the question of the possibility of perpetual peace{3}, one of the main issues he addresses is the definition of the ideal form of government/regime (forma regiminis) that would contribute to perpetual peace. He essentially argues that the only regime that would secure a peaceful civil society is the one based on the universal idea of law and justice, which he calls republican constitutionalism {4} (Kant, 2006, 8:351, p. 75). Kant expresses the basic principles of republican constitutionalism as the ideals of freedom of the members of a society as human beings, interdependence among the members of the society as subjects, and equality of the members of the society as citizens (Kant, 2006, 8:350, p. 74). Thus, Kant primarily advocates the universal ideals of justice, equality, and freedom and believes that true civil society can only emerge through agreement on these shared ideals. {5}

One of the main reasons Kant argues for republican constitutionalism as the right form of government is that it presupposes the active participation of each individual in decision making. For example, in Toward Perpetual Peace, Kant argues that it is only under republican constitutionalism that people can decide whether or not to participate in a war or not (Kant, 2006, 8:351, p. 75). In other regimes, however, it is the political authority, such as the king, etc., that decides whether or not to go to war. Moreover, Kant claims that any moral and rational actor in a republican constitutional state can participate in the vote. In this context, Kant distinguishes between active and passive citizenship. He explains that the moral and rational actors who are self-governing and financially independent are the active citizens of the state who have the right to vote, while those who are not morally mature and are financially dependent, such as women, etc., are passive citizens of the state who have no right to vote. {6}

Kant also argues that in republican constitutionalism there is a separation between the executive and legislative powers, in the sense that the executive branch does not have all the power, but is controlled and limited by the universal laws of justice and liberty (checks and balances). In other words, under republican constitutionalism, the executive can never violate the universal law that ultimately guarantees human liberty, justice, and equality. Covell argues that this limitation of executive power in republican constitutionalism guarantees that the political sovereign remains the true representative of the people (Covell, 1998, p. 65). Further, Kant says that the sovereign in republican constitutionalism is not the master of the people but the servant of the people because his task is to represent the will of the people. In other words, Kant claims that the power of the sovereign in republican constitutional society is directly determined by the will of the people. {7} Republican constitutionalism is therefore argued to be a form of government that guarantees the separation of the legislative and executive powers to ensure that the universal laws of justice and liberty are properly implemented. Covell comments on this representative nature of the legislative power of republican constitutionalism by pointing out that the legislative power in republican constitutionalism directly reflects the choices of individuals (Covell, 1998, p. 53). In other words, according to Covell, Kant shows that in republican constitutionalism there is a direct relationship between the general will of society and the will of individuals.

 

3 International Union: Federalism

As for the cosmopolitan ideal of permanent peace, Kant basically argues that it cannot simply be constructed on a national level. By this, he means that nations, even if they establish themselves as republican constitutional states, would not remain peaceful and free if they remain isolated and fragmented from one another. In this regard, Kant thinks that nations are like individuals in a state of nature, hostile to each other in the absence of binding authority or law. Accordingly, he notes that nations, much like individuals forming a civil society, should unite to sign a peace treaty that guarantees perpetual peace among themselves. In Toward Perpetual Peace, he states:

But peace can be neither brought about nor secured without a treaty among peoples, and for this reason a special sort of federation must be created, which one might call a pacific federation (foedus pacificum). This federation would be distinct from a peace treaty (pactum pacis) in that it seeks to end not merely one war, as does the latter, but rather to end all wars forever (Kant, 2006, 8:356, p. 80).

Kant thus states that the peace treaty between nations involves the idea of a peaceful federation between nations. In other words, he argues that nations can only establish peace and freedom if they 'federate' under the common ideals of justice, equality, and freedom.
Accordingly, Kant explains federalism as follows:

For if fortune so determines that a powerful and enlightened people can constitute itself as a republic (which according to its nature necessarily tends toward perpetual peace), then this republic provides a focus point for other states, so that they might join this federative union and thereby secure the condition of peace among states in accordance with the idea of international right and gradually extend this union further and further through several such associations (Kant, 2006, 8:356, p. 80).

Kant here argues for the unification of individuals and nations under a peaceful federation through the common ideal of universal law. In this regard, it can be argued that the Kantian ideal of federalism is a unifying project such that Kant advocates the unification of nations as opposed to the division or fragmentation among them. In the "Idea for a Universal History," Kant argues that federalism is based on the principle of the general and unified will of each state (Kant 2006: 10). In this sense, he acknowledges that federalism is not a system in which nations can exercise their own power to maintain their peace or freedom, but they must rely on the common power and unified will of the federation. In this context, Anderson-Gold argues that nations in the Kantian concept of federalism are not atomic entities (Baiusu, Philstoerm, and Williams, 2011, p. 237). Anderson-Gold points to the fact that Kant's federal ideal includes the idea that the independence of nations is determined by mutual recognition and mutual interaction between them. In this sense, Anderson-Gold suggests that nations in Kant's federal ideal are not atomically free, but rather define their freedom through their mutual interaction, which is based on common law. Similarly, Covell points to the unifying aspect of Kantian political theory by saying that nations in Kantian political theory are not selfish or self-interested entities, but rather are bound together by the common principles of right and justice (Covell, 1998, p. 70).

The idea that nations cannot be free or autonomous to do anything against the common will of the federation may sound tyrannical in itself. Yet Kant is very careful to point out that nations are not passive or non-autonomous entities within the union of the federation. Rather, he asserts that they have their own individual autonomy. In this sense, Kant rejects the tyrannical project of eliminating the individual autonomy of nations under the common ideals, but rather emphasizes that nations should develop their individual autonomy on the ground of the universal ideals of the federation. In this sense, Covell emphasizes that the states in the Kantian federation are not suddenly brought together under the rule of a particular international power, but the federation is a union to which states participate independently and voluntarily (Covell, 1998, p. 125). Similarly, Gallie argues that the Kantian federation is not an association of states under a particular authority like an empire, but is based on the idea that nations freely and collectively construct their own identity and self-reliance (Gallie, 1978, p. 23). Similarly, Richard Tuck argues that in the Kantian federal union all nations are equally free and respect their own identity (Tuck, 1999, p. 220). In summary, Kant's idea of federalism does not extinguish the individual autonomy and identity of nations, but rather enables them to develop individually within the limits and principles of freedom and justice of other nations.
Moreover, the fact that Kant emphasizes the importance of the autonomy and freedom of nations and requires nations to have a certain autonomy in order to be part of the federation could appear as an elitist approach. To put it more clearly, Covell argues that nations in Kantian thought are not natural members of the federation. Rather, they undergo the normative process of building a republican constitutional state based on the ideals of justice, equality, and freedom. In this sense, nations must be autonomous and enlightened enough to be part of the federation (Covell, 1998, p. 141). In this sense, one might assume that the Kantian idea of federation excludes those nations that are not autonomous or enlightened enough. However, Kant clearly rejects this elitist view by suggesting that every community is equal on the basis of universal law and justice and that all are equally included in the ideal of federalism. In this regard, Kant criticizes the inhospitable and colonizing attitude of civilized states (Kant 2006: 82-83). He argues that non-states and their inhabitants cannot be considered as nothing by the civilized world (Baiusu, Philstoerm, and Williams, 2011, p. 242). Anderson-Golds argues that the terms of Kant's right are universal and there is no difference between civilized and non-civilized people in terms of their universal right to be members of a federation (Baiusu, Philstoerm, and Williams, 2011, p. 243). In this sense, for Kant, the non-autonomous or non-enlightened communities are as welcome as the members of the federation. By
this context, Cowell argues that the Kantian ideal of federalism promises an alternative to power-based political rhetoric on an international scale (Covell, 1998, p. 131). Covell argues that Kantian federalism rejects the international order that is characterized by the rhetoric of superiority and inferiority, i.e., the dichotomy between a legislative power of the superior nation and the inferior power that is bound by the laws. In contrast to this hierarchical approach, Kantian federalism recognizes that each nation is equally bound by universal laws (Baiusu, Philstoerm, and Williams, 2011, p. 241). {8}

Moreover, Kant considers federalism as an ongoing and progressive project that evolves through the development of individuals and nations. In this sense, Kant argues that federalism is not a static or self-contained system, but a progressive and open system that emerges through the growth and development of states and individuals toward the common ideals of justice, equality, and freedom. Covell expresses this progressive aspect of federalism by saying that it is an act of progress toward international peace in its conformity to the rule of law (Covell, 1998, p. 124-125). Similarly Gallie writes that the Kantian federal ideal involves the voluntary and progressive movement of nations toward a permanent peace (Gallie, 1978, p. 22).

 

4 Cosmopolitanism

The Kantian ideal of permanent peace and freedom inevitably transcends the national and international framework. Rather, it promises to be a universal and cosmopolitan project based ultimately on the unification of individuals and states under the common ideals of justice, freedom, and equality. In Metaphysics of Morals, Kant emphasizes that the cosmopolitan ideal of peace and freedom is not a philanthropic ideal but a principle of right (Kant, 2006, 6:352, p. 146). Kant defines the third and last stage of the cosmopolitan project of peace and freedom as the realization of the cosmopolitan right (Weltbürgerrecht) by expressing it as follows: “… cosmopolitan right, to the extent that individuals and states, who are related externally by the mutual exertion of influence on each other, are to be regarded as citizens of a universal state of humankind (ius cosmopoliticum)” (Kant, 2006, 8:349, p. 73). Here Kant emphasizes the unification of individuals and states under the common ideal of humanity. He believes that in the final stage of cosmopolitan peace and freedom, individuals and states will transcend the boundaries of national and international borders by discovering their common roots and ideals as humanity and forming a unity on that basis. In this sense, Kant's cosmopolitan ideal means that all national, racial, ethnic, linguistic, etc. differences will be overcome under the common ideals of humanity. Similarly, Kant envisions in the basic work that at the final stage of social development, an ethical society will emerge, which he calls the "kingdom of ends."{9} He explicitly argues that the ethical society is a cosmopolitan ideal in which individuals construct themselves as moral agents and achieve self-autonomy by respecting each other as ends in themselves. Pauline Kleingeld, in her article "Kant's Cosmopolitan Patriotism," refers to this form of cosmopolitanism in Kantian thought as moral cosmopolitanism (Kleingeld, 2003, p. 301). She defines it as a form of cosmopolitanism in which all people have moral obligations to each other as members of a single moral community, regardless of their nationality, religion, ethnicity, language, and so on. Allen W. Wood, in "Kant's Philosophy of History," writes that individuals who are part of the "kingdom of ends" are necessarily part of the world community as well (Kant, 2006, p. 261). He basically suggests that the Kantian conception of cosmopolitanism as a realm of ends corresponds to a world community in which people interact freely with each other as independent and moral beings and harmonize with each other in a systematic combination.

Unlike the international law of federalism, which governs interactions between states, cosmopolitan law in Kantian thought governs interactions between states and individuals (Kleingeld, 2003, p. 302). According to cosmopolitan law, states and individuals have the right to establish relations with other states and their citizens. Covell argues that this cosmopolitan ideal of Kant, which implies that not only states but also individuals can freely interact with each other in the world, was revolutionary in his time (Covell, 1998, p. 143-144). Covell notes that in contrast to the realist and internationalist paradigms of Hobbes and Grotius, Kantian cosmopolitanism represents a universalist project that places the freedom of the individual above all else. According to Covell, Kantian cosmopolitanism holds that any moral imperative of humanity would permit crossing any national or international boundary if it were a necessity in itself. Thus, Kantian cosmopolitanism can be viewed to suggest that human freedom and morality are the most important and urgent elements of cosmopolitanism. {10} In this regard, in Towards Perpetual Peace, Kant fundamentally links the ideal of cosmopolitan society to the concepts of hospitality and global trade (transport). With respect to hospitality, Kant argues that every human being has a right to reside in a particular place on earth. He argues that people should respect each other as neighbors or visitors and allow them to visit any place on earth without any hostility (Kant, 2006, 8:358, p. 82). Kant thus argues that everyone has the right to visit any place on earth without any hostility from the host country. Thus, Kant's concept of hospitality can be interpreted as a path to cosmopolitan interaction between individuals and states, through which they would interact with different parts of the world as cosmopolitan actors. Regarding trade, Kant argues that states, as finite entities and owners of certain lands, necessarily trade with each other and that this brings people together on a global scale (Kant, 2006, 6:353, p. 146). Further, he suggests that although wars and conflicts separate people from each other, the spirit of trade dominates them and they find peaceful methods to overcome these conflicts in order to trade with each other (Kant, 2006, 8:368, p. 92). Therefore, Kant argues that trade leads people to interact with each other and establish close relationships on a global scale. {11}

For Kant, cosmopolitanism as a project is never fully achievable. Rather, it is a purposive concept that humanity must always strive to achieve. In Anthropology, Kant says that the idea of cosmopolitan society is not a constitutive principle, but a regulative principle that must be observed which humanity must always strive to attain (Kant, 2006, 7:331, p. 174). In this respect, we can relate the Kantian ideal of cosmopolitanism to his ontological ideal of the moral law or the concept of the highest good. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant argues that the highest good as the object of man's morality can never be fully achieved because man is limited and finite in himself (Kant, 1998, A 811/B 839 and Kant, 2002, 5:122, p. 98-99). In other words, Kant claims that man can never realize the moral law as such, but can only move toward it. {12} Therefore, Kant states that the highest good as the ideal of human morality means that the moral agent is always striving for it. Similar to his ontology, the Kantian concept of cosmopolitanism has a similar framework. According to Kant, cosmopolitan peace and freedom can never be fully achieved, but they are teleological ends in themselves towards which societies and individuals should always strive.
In summary, Kantian cosmopolitanism entails that individuals, as moral agents, can interact peacefully and freely with other agents on earth based on the universal principles of equality, justice, and freedom. Furthermore, it is an ongoing process of building a peaceful and free environment on a global scale in which individuals and states participate by evolving through the universal and rational ideals of humanity.

 

5 The Role of Moral Progress in the Realization of the Cosmopolitan Ideal

Up to this point we have discussed the three-stage progress of societies towards the cosmopolitan ideal of peace and freedom. Our aim in the remainder of this paper will be to explain the methods for realizing this goal. It is obvious that, for Kant, the cosmopolitan ideal of permanent peace and freedom cannot be achieved simply by war, political overthrow, or revolution. First, it should be noted that Kant unequivocally condemns war as an irrational act that should be pursued as a method for achieving permanent peace, arguing that it is barbaric, unsophisticated, and brutal. In Towards Perpetual Peace he writes,

We view with great disdain the way in which savages cling to their lawless freedom, preferring to fight continually amongst one another rather than submit to a lawful coercion that they themselves establish, and thereby favoring mad freedom over rational freedom. We consider this a barbaric, unrefined, and a brutish denigration of humanity (Kant, 2006, 8:354, p. 78).

Kant describes the state of war as a lawless or irrational freedom and calls it a depraved state of humanity. Rather, he argues that instead of brutally fighting each other, communities should establish themselves as lawfully free nations and find ways to cooperate with each other under the constraints of legal concepts of rational justice and freedom. Jean Francois Drolet, in his article "Nietzsche, Kant, the Democratic State, and War," draws attention to the fact that war in Kantian thought is a phenomenon of the alienation of the self from itself and the world in general, and he argues that this can only be overcome by a rational union of people (Drolet, 2013, p. 34). Furthermore, Kant emphasizes that war is not a means to achieve universal or cosmopolitan law, suggesting that war cannot be associated with universal law (Kant, 2006, 8:355, p. 79-80). In other words, Kant argues that war is not a normative and legislative concept and therefore not a legal and rational way to pursue one’s rights. Therefore, for Kant, an individual or a state cannot obtain its universal right through war. In this sense, Kant excludes war from the basis of normativity and legislation, arguing that it is not a legitimate way to create lasting peace and freedom.
Similarly, Kant does not recognize political overthrow or revolution as a legitimate and appropriate way to create lasting peace and freedom. Some of his remarks about revolution in "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" and in the Metaphysics of Morals suggest that legislative and moral progress toward perpetual peace can only be achieved through gradual reform, not revolution or overthrow (Kant, 2006, 8:36, p. 18; Kant, 2006, 6:322, p. 120; Kant, 2006, 6:322, p. 121; Kant, 2006, 6:355, p. 148-149). Kant clearly disregards sudden and revolutionary change as a means of securing perpetual peace and argues that perpetual peace can only be achieved through firm principles and gradual progress.

At this point, it is appropriate to focus on what gradual progress and reform actually mean in Kant’s political theory. If we return to the introductory part of this article, we can easily see that the Kantian idea of gradual progress can be linked to the moral and rational growth of individuals. In other words, Kant believes that it is the moral progress of individuals that enables societies to move toward cosmopolitan peace and freedom. However, Kant believes that humanity in modern times is very immature in terms of creating a peaceful and free cosmopolitan society. In "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" Kant argues that humanity is in an immature state in which it cannot think rationally and freely. Kant points out that people lack the courage to use their own reason and instead rely on the guidance and direction of others (Kant, 2006, 8:35, p. 17). Thus, Kant explains that the main reason for humanity's immaturity in using its own reason is inertia, cowardice, and convenience (Kant, 2006, 8:35, p. 17). In this regard, Kant disapproves of people being guided by other authorities such as the church, experts, or technological advances. Furthermore, in "Idea for a Universal History," Kant points out that humanity is very premature in terms of morality and argues that it can only be cultivated through education (Kant, 2006, 8:26, p. 12). He argues that civilization and progress cannot simply be associated with developments in art and culture or social politeness or decency, but only with moral cultivation. In this sense, Kant points to the central role of morality in the progress of humanity and civilization. Thus, according to Kant, every individual is obliged to achieve moral autonomy through his rational efforts to understand the idea of freedom. In other words, each individual must rationally grapple with freedom and construct himself as an autonomous person. However, as James DiCenso argues in Kant, Religion and Politics, moral freedom cannot be constructed individually, but only within a society (DiCenso, 2011, p. 46). Similarly, J. G. Murphy in Kant: The Philosophy of Right argues that there is a direct connection between individual freedom and the freedom of society in Kantian theory. Murphy says that in Kant, the freedom of the individual and the freedom of society are interdependent (Murphy, 1994, p. 127). He basically argues that, according to Kant, the freedom of society can only be shaped by individuals and the freedom of individuals can only be secured in a peaceful and free civil society. However, as DiCenso goes on to point out, Kant shows that religious and political authorities in the modern era are notorious for abusing the freedom and autonomy of individuals in ways that claim to be guardians of the people (DiCenso, 2011, p. 49-50). In other words, as Kant says, political authorities take control of people in ways that inhibit their natural and moral development.

As a way out of this moral conundrum on the societal level, in "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" Kant basically calls on people to wake up from this slumber in which they do not use their own reason (Kant, 2006, 8:35, p. 17). Therefore, Kant believes that the only way to change this state of moral immaturity is for people to wake up from their slumber of not using their own reason. In this regard, when Kant calls for "Sapere Aude!" he seems to be asking people to reflect on the universal concepts of justice, equality, and freedom that they possess as a priori potential. In other words, Kant states that only by enlightening individuals about the universal ideals of humanity can society evolve toward the cosmopolitan ideal of peace and freedom. At this point, it is appropriate to say that Kant sees a direct connection between the microcosmic level of moral improvement in terms of the ideals of freedom and justice and the macrocosmic possibility of a free and just society. In this context, Covell and Gallie say that peace is not a natural phenomenon, but a construction of humanity (Covell, 1998, p. 69 and Gallie, 1978, p. 35). In this sense, they both refer to the active role of individuals in creating peace and freedom. Similarly, in her lectures on Kant's political philosophy, Hannah Arendt points out that the individual is the fundamental agent in the Kantian conception of social and political progress (Arendt, 1982, p. 58). Arendt argues that in Kantian moral philosophy, any social or political progress can only be achieved through the progress of individuals. Kant's call to wake up from slumber thus seems to be an attempt to revive the sense of moral progress in individuals, which he sees as the ultimate way/method for achieving the ideal of cosmopolitan peace and freedom.

 

6 Conclusion
In conclusion, the Kantian ideal of cosmopolitan peace and liberty appears to be an ongoing process of convergence toward the ideals of justice, equality, and liberty, as evidenced by the three-stage development of society, namely republican constitutionalism, federalism, and cosmopolitanism. It has been argued that the cosmopolitan ideal in Kant`s political theory is not a utopian dream, but a realizable phenomenon insofar as societies at the national, international, and global levels develop into peaceful, just, and free societies, which is possible only when they unite under the common ideals of humanity. Moreover, it has been argued that the moral growth and progress of individuals in relation to the universal ideals of justice, equality, and freedom plays a central role in the realization of this cosmopolitan ideal. In this regard, it has been pointed out that the more individuals educate and enlighten themselves with respect to the universal ideals of justice and freedom, the more likely they are to achieve cosmopolitan peace and cosmopolitan freedom. However, since Kant believes that the moral progress of individuals cannot be achieved by moral agents themselves, but is only possible within society, he basically proposes that the idea of the moral progress of individuals should be the primary goal of societies, as the most important step in achieving the cosmopolitan ideal of peace and freedom.

 

 

Notes

 

{1} In Kant and The Law of Peace Charles Covell points out that the Kantian understanding of human history is a teleological and purposive in itself (Covell, 1998, p. 149).

{2} In the "Idea of a Universal History," Kant states that man is not an instinctive being who would simply act mechanically, but a rational being who has a free will to act and think (Kant 2006: 5). Hence, Kant assumes that man can create and produce everything from himself and is not dependent on any other inner knowledge or authority. In Kant and Modern Political Philosophy, Katrin Flikschuh points out that the Kantian conception of man as an autonomous entity that produces and constructs everything it has itself is consistent with the liberal conception of the 'self' (Flikschuh, 2000, p. 18). In this sense, we can say that, in Kant's view, the individual is not passively determined by conditions, but freely determines himself. Returning to our main discussion, it would be appropriate to say that Kant believes that society is not an arbitrary organization, but is constructed by the free will and reason of individuals.

 

{3} Gallie argues that Kant is not a pacifist philosopher but he regards war as the greatest evil for the human societies. (Gallie, 1978, p. 21-22).

{4} In Towards Perpetual Peace Kant says that the republican constitutionalism is the only form of government that springs from the pure concept of right (Kant, 2006, 8:351, p. 75).

{5} In this sense, the Kantian project of republican constitutionalism stands in complete contrast to the pragmatist and utilitarian projects of societies that merely pursue their self-interest (Waldron, 2006, p. 179).

{6} This distinction Kant makes between the active and the passive citizens might appear per se to be non-egalitarian. However, Kant offers that the active citizens are so reasonable and moral that they would not violate the rights of the passive citizens and they would consider the rights of the passive citizens. Kant also suggests that every person has the right and the opportunity to be a moral and rational agent who has the right to choose. In other words, Kant states that active citizenship is an open and ongoing process that includes every person who grows morally and rationally. Therefore, Kant proposes that republican constitutionalism would guarantee the representation of every member of society on an equal basis.

{7} Incidentally, Kant's critique of democracy in Toward Perpetual Peace is very much in line with this discussion. Kant fundamentally criticizes democracy for being a system that does not represent all people. He argues that democracy is a form of system in which the rights of the minority can easily be violated (Kant, 2006, 8:352, p. 76). According to Kant, in democracy, the majority decides, and the rights of the minority, which does not necessarily agree with the majority, are neglected. In this sense, Kant argues that democracy can turn into a despotic form of government because the power of the majority can grow to the point that the minority is completely excluded from the political arena (Kant, 2006, 8:352, p. 76 and Covell, 1998, p. 65). Kant also notes that democracy can violate the separation of the legislative and executive branches in the sense that the power of the majority can grow to the point where it can control both the executive and legislative branches (Covell, 1998, p. 66).

{8} See also Covell (1998) who argues that Kantian federalism, based on the universal laws of justice, liberty, and equality, includes all nations regardless of ethnicity, race, or religion (Cowell, 1998, p. 146). Covell asserts that Kantian federalism aims to eliminate differences among states and essentially to unite them under the common ideals of justice, equality, and liberty.

{9} Kant, 1997, 4:434, p. 41.

{10} However, the fact that human morality and freedom is the most important element of Kantian cosmopolitanism does not necessarily mean that Kant's cosmopolitan society is an anarchic utopia in which everyone can do whatever they want (Gallie, 1978, p. 27). Rather, we should keep in mind that cosmopolitanism does not necessarily override the universal laws of republican constitutionalism and federalism; on the contrary, it is embedded in them.

{11} According to Georg Cavallar, Kant's intercourse cannot be limited to trade; it also includes cultural and intellectual exchange (Cavallar, 2015, p. 53-54).

{12} Similarly, in her article "The Development of Kant's Cosmopolitanism," Pauline Kleingeld states that moralization in Kantian thought is never fully realizable, but is always an approximation (Kleingeld, 2014, p. 72).

 

 

 

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